Eric L. Perry

After many years of intense controversy and debate about tobacco and its marketing, a landmark settlement occurred in 1998 between 46 U.S. states and producers of tobacco products. The agreement states that tobacco companies must spend $246 billion over the next 25 years to settle health claims. The settlement also demanded companies put a senior vice-president over youth smoking prevention activities. The way that tobacco firms have responded to this last edict continues to be hotly contested.

Tobacco marketing heavily targets a progressively younger audience. The tobacco industry loses 5,000 customers every day in the U.S.—3,500 who are able to quit and 1,200 who die. The most promising “replacement smokers” to this loss are young people: 90% of all smokers begin before age 21 and 60% of smokers had their first light before age 14. Strategies include incorporating cartoons, such as Joe Camel, into advertising; offering free samples of tobacco products, where permissible by law; sponsoring popular events attended by youth; offering branded merchandise for sale or in exchange for product proof-of-purchase; and playing on the traits of “coolness,” risktaking, or defiance.

A review of corporate literature—focused particularly on the two largest U.S. producers, Phillip Morris (PM) and R.J. Reynolds—yielded some interesting insights into tobacco advertising philosophy. With the MSA completed, some firms are becoming more willing to appear supportive of the required measures, while others have chosen to adhere to the mandated activities in a subvert manner to further their causes. From the review, PM seems to have made the greatest change in direction. Their website features such links as “Youth Smoking Prevention” and “Health Issues for Smokers.” The company presents an effort to educate the public on the effects of their products— hoping to create a sense of “genuine concern” and pseudo-accountability for those effects. A PM marketing director expressed a belief that the decision to smoke is an individual matter. By providing honest information and accepting the responsibility for their products, PM hopes to be the vendor of choice to those who make the decision to smoke. Still, as critics point out, the end that PM is pursuing through the PR parade remains an improved bottom line.

Experts claim that R.J. Reynolds’ reaction to the MSA is entirely different from PM’s. The Camel brand is by far Reynolds’ most popular and it leads the pack in provocative youth advertising as well. A market analyst suggests that R.J. Reynolds has launched “a new front of advertisements for their much-vilified cigarettes that challenge anti-smoking activists as killjoys and prudes who deserve defiance and ridicule.” In all forms of advertising, Reynolds seems to include almost subliminal messages to youth, encouraging them to test the bounds of authority and reason. Attempts to reach Reynolds marketing staff for participation in this investigation were in vain.

Internet searches and direct contact with anti-tobacco coalition leaders have produced some data and evidence that substantiates the claim that tobacco companies target youth in advertising. Corporate memoranda show that Reynolds held discussion around product lines for youth, ages 14- 18, as early as 1967. A 1979 PM memo suggests pride in the fact that “Marlboro dominates in the 17 and younger age category, capturing over 50 percent of the market.” The research done in this area sustains that these communications are not anomalies, rather they are the norm of an industry driven by secrecy and deception. Other internal correspondence, not within the scope of the study, suggests massive cover up in research on tobacco connections to cancer and other related illnesses.

A review of TV commercials produced by these two companies in 1999 supports the assertions of underlying messaging from PM and R.J. Reynolds. Still, despite hidden messages and agendas, the commercials and other media are stirring awareness about tobacco and its accompanying risks.

A study conducted by the Boston University School of Public Health found that youth in Massachusetts between the ages of 12 and 13 who were exposed to anti-smoking messages on television were half as likely to start smoking as those who had not seen such advertisements. However, older teens (ages 14 to 15), were not as strongly influenced by watching the same ads. This study did not discriminate among those advertisements created by tobacco companies versus those created by anti-tobacco coalitions. Other studies have discovered that anti-tobacco campaigns, regardless of their source, make a powerful impact by causing youth to ask questions, obtain facts, and make more guided decisions.

Interviews with junior high school health faculty and observation of several classes provided me with shocking insight. Almost every student was well acquainted with various cigarette brands and had experienced to some degree the anti-smoking campaigning—several students even willing admitted to having had previous experience with cigarettes and chewing tobacco. Tobacco firms are clearly getting value for the dollars they pour into their marketing departments. Students, while in class, generally reflected attitudes of disgust with the practice of smoking and chewing. Sadly, the questions that cannot honestly be answered include: (1) whether such are their true feelings or only a performance for the classroom and (2) how the subversive advertising of calculating tobacco marketers will play out over time in the lives of these young people.

In light of the controversy surrounding tobacco marketing, I also assessed the financial condition of the largest U.S. tobacco companies. On average, U.S. tobacco companies spend $15 million every day—more than $5.6 billion annually—to advertise their products. Despite recently intensified opposition to their efforts, these firms remain highly profitable and grow steadily. PM 1999 sales totaled $19.6B, up 28% from the previous year; R.J. Reynolds sales stood at $7.6B for 1999, up 32.4% from the prior year; Brown & Williamson ended 1999 with $5.4B in sales, up 19.4% from 1998; and Lorillard 1999 sales totaled $4.1B, up 41.9% from the previous year.

When I started my work on this project, I wanted to understand how much effort tobacco firms direct toward developing clientele among minors. I designed my research and interviews to remain as objective as possible. I expected to find that the industry looked at young people as an appealing portion of a larger market. The data I have gathered leaves me amazed at how critical minors are to the growth and success of the tobacco industry. Recent rulings and restrictions have everything to do with corporate profitability—and each company is selecting the strategy best suited to preserve its interest in the fertile youth market. The tobacco settlement is a welcome support in the fight against smoking, particularly in campaigning towards youth. But—in light of the corporate billions spent each year to promote smoking—How effective will the $250 billion be in preventing youth from developing a smoking habit while they are young and even when they are older? There is no sure answer to this question but what time and experience will provide.