Brock Evans Taylor and Dr. Donna Lee Bowen, Political Science
The formal organization of the Gulf Cooperation Council began on February 4, 1981. After a ceremonial reading of a Qu’ranic Surah the heads of state of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman agreed in principle to facilitate cooperation between their respective countries. During the subsequent months, a formal charter was drafted and ratified by each government, legislating formal cooperation in economic, social, and political spheres. Since its formation, critics have reviewed the behavior and effects of the GCC’s, analyzing the fruits of the union.
A correct understanding of the Gulf Cooperation Council’s successes and failures is contingent upon understanding the cooperation’s formation. Most scholars have interpreted the formation of the GCC as a reaction to the Iran-Iraq War. Scholars who accept balance-of-power theory suggest that most security threats in the Gulf region stem from the political vacuum created by the British withdrawal in 1971. Without a traditional hegemon the region plunged into political chaos. As would be expected, Iran and Iraq, the strongest states in the region, sought to establish regional hegemony. The political situation in the Gulf changed dramatically in 1979 with the Iranian Revolution and the emergence of a regime with revisionist territorial goals. Hoping to capitalize upon the political instability of Iran caused by the Islamic Revolution, Iraq elevated its historic territorial conflict with Iran by invading Iran on September 22, 1980. The small and relatively weaker Gulf monarchies, threatened by the possibility of a fanatical Iranian hegemon and possibly being dragged into the Iran-Iraq war, came together to form a collective security organization, the GCC.
However, at the Gulf Cooperation Council’s inception, the Iran-Iraq war was not a significant enough threat to be considered the primary reason for the cooperation council’s formation. Iraq invaded Iran on September 22, 1980. Throughout the majority of the Iran-Iraq war the Gulf monarchies actively supported Iraq, demonstrating that they felt most threatened by Iran. The Gulf monarchies arrived at a decision to form the Gulf Cooperation Council on February 4, 1981. Iran did not become a military threat until September 1981, when they launched their first successful offensive. By this time the GCC had already been in existence for almost half a year.1 Although the Iran-Iraq War became an increasing threat after the GCC’s inception, the chronology of events clearly shows that the Iran-Iraq War cannot be considered the Gulf Cooperation Council’s primary raison d’etre.
Others have suggested that the Gulf Cooperation Council was formed as an economic group similar to the European Economic Community, following the “contemporary trend . . . toward big political and economic unities.”2 Those who accept this line of reasoning overly emphasize Secretary General Bisharah’s statements that the GCC’s charter “does not specifically refer to politics” and that “priority is given to economic issues.”3 Although these early statements demonstrate that the Gulf Cooperation Council was intended to be an economic cooperation, they leave a number of unanswered questions. Why did Gulf monarchs’ desire an economic cooperation? Why respond to expansionist Iran by expanding trade cooperation, initiating monetary cooperation, and encouraging the flow of labor?
Careful analysis of Gulf Cooperation Council documents reveals that Gulf monarchs felt that “the need for a [cooperation] council is more urgent at present than ever before for the good of the peoples [more correctly for the good of the monarchs] of the region.”4 GCC Founding Fathers sought to follow “the contemporary trend” of “big political and economic unities for the preservation of stability and security.”5 The Gulf Cooperation Council was formed to face “the challenges confronting this region.”6 What exactly were “the challenges confronting this region”? How were they subversive to “stability and security”? The working paper indirectly answers these questions. It explains that “international designs will not be able to find a foothold in a merged region which has one voice, opinion, and strength. However, they will be able to find a thousand footholds if this region, which is rich in oil and men, remains made up of small entities that can be easily victimized.”7 This statement refers directly to Iranian clerics’ “international designs” for the exportation of the Islamic Revolution. The group “easily victimized” is clearly poor Shiite populations throughout the Gulf. Thus, the original, underlying purpose for creating the GCC was not economic or external security threats. Instead, “the real catalyst for action” was the common threat posed by Iran to domestic regime security.8
In short, the Gulf Cooperation Council was a direct response to the domestic threat created by subversive Iranian propaganda campaigns. Iranian clerics, anxious to export the Islamic Revolution and expand the Islamic Republic, sought to enlist poor Shiite populations to overthrow existing regimes, replacing them with a “more Islamic” form of government. Thus, the GCC Founding Fathers sought were to create a forum for negotiating cooperation among the six states in order to promote domestic tranquility and internal regime security.
The Gulf Cooperation Council responded to the subversive domestic threat created by Iranian propaganda campaigns in two ways. First, it increased the monarchies’ legitimacy by moving closer to the long-held goals of an Islamic community (umma) and an Arab community (qawmiyyah). Second, it provided economic benefits that could be targeted to dissatisfied Shiite population.9
References
- R. K. Ramazani, The Gulf Cooperation Council: Record and Analysis (Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1988): 10.
- GCC Working Paper, 26 May 1981. In R. K. Ramazani, The Gulf Cooperation Council: Record and Analysis (Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1988): 30.
- GCC Secretary General Bisharah’s Press Conference, 27 May 1981. In R. K. Ramazani, The Gulf Cooperation Council: Record and Analysis (Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1988): 31.
- GCC Working Paper, 1981. With emphasis added.
- Ibid. With emphasis added.
- Ibid.
- Ibid.
- Ramazani 1988, 7.
- Scott Cooper and Brock Taylor, “Power and Regionalism: Explaining Economic Cooperation in the Persian Gulf,” Paper prepared for the 42nd Annual International Studies Association Convention, 20-24 February 2001, Chicago.