Audrey Spear and Dr. Douglas F. Tobler, History

On March 3, 1961, the South African Prime Minister, Dr. Hendrik Verwoerd, departed for a Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference in London in high spirits. By 1961, the inclusion of independent states in the British Commonwealth of Nations was an established principle, and there was no reason to suppose that they would deny South Africa membership in that body because of her new republican status. Nevertheless, he returned later that same month, having withdrawn South Africa’s applications for membership. This was merely one step in South Africa’s troubled path from a pillar of the Allied cause to a pariah in international circles. The reasons for this involve Dr. Verwoerd’s personality, the increasing number of African States gaining independence and growing international abhorrence for South Africa’s racial policies.

Dr. Verwoerd was a man with fixed-focus in vision, fanatically devoted to his dream of converting the Union of South Africa into and independent South African Republic. Initially, he envisioned such a republic to be outside the Commonwealth, free form all British ties. However, South Africa also had many English-speaking voters, and Verwoerd needed to secure their support for his republican ideal. Thus, on August 3, 1960, he announced a referendum for October 5, to determine whether South Africa should become a republic inside the Commonwealth. It was with this understanding that white South Africans went to the polls and voted to become a republic.1

As mentioned, the precedent had already been established for independent states to be members of the Commonwealth. India had gained independence in 1949, Pakistan in 1955, and Ghana is 1960. However, on his departure for London, Verwoerd intimated the possibility of exclusion:

We are going to Britain as friends. . . . It is important, in order to assure cooperation in all matters common concern, that the Commonwealth should maintain its present character and policy of non-interference in each other’s affairs. We hope that this will be the case because South Africa will then be able to retain its membership of this group of independent nations.2

Unfortunately, such was not the case. South Africa’s racial policies had exited much international disapprobation. In addition, the timing was not propitious. South Africa’s attempts to incorporate the mandated territory of South West Africa into the republic and extend her racial policies there were widely criticized in the UNO. Leading the attack on South Africa were many former African and Asian colonies who objected to South Africa’s treatment of Africans and Asians.

Many of these same newly-independent states were members of the British Commonwealth. In particular, Ghana and India were adamant in their refusal to countenance South African membership, unless South Africa was willing to revise her racial policies. Verwoerd’s position, articulated repeatedly throughout his term in office, remained firm, “We will see to it that we remain in power in this white South Africa.” Harold MacMillan, the British Prime Minister, did his diplomatic best to find an acceptable solution to the impasse.

MacMillan’s proposed solution allowed South Africa to remain a member of the Commonwealth, with the provision that the abhorrence of apartheid by the other ten leaders at the conference  recorded, with a disclaimer that the acceptance of South Africa’s retention in the Commonwealth implied any condonation of her racial discrimination. Although Verwoerd resented the implied interference in South Africa’s affairs, he agreed to this proposal. However, the Afro-Asian states refused to accept it, saying they would even move that South Africa be expelled. They would never let the matter drop. Dr. Nkrumah of Ghana remained especially adamant, and many of those present followed his lead. Verwoerd withdrew the application for membership in the British Commonwealth of Nations.3

On his return to South Africa, Verwoerd offered three reasons for his action. First, South Africa’s color policy would have been continuously discussed and would have constituted continuous interference; second, certain members wanted to reserve the right at any time to introduce a motion for the expulsion of South Africa from the Commonwealth (which would have carried in the contemporary international political climate). Third, certain members also wanted to reserve the right to reconsider their own position in the Commonwealth if South Africa were permitted to remain a member. In the interests of “our friends” in the Commonwealth, particularly the United Kingdom, he said “[he] could not place them in the invidious position of having to choose between South Africa and a group of Afro-Asian states.”4

It is remarkable how Verwoerd managed to portray this failure in London as a success. On his return to Cape Town, he declared: “What happened in London was not a defeat, but a victory . . . something greater than we could have expected has happened. . . . We have freed ourselves from the Afro-Asian states.”5 While the withdrawal of South Africa’s application is understandable, it was nonetheless regrettable. MacMillan, addressing the British Parliament, indicated that South Africa might have remained a republic inside the Commonwealth of Nations, had Verwoerd been at all willing to relax his inflexible stance on racial policy. However, Verwoerd was incapable of providing such reassurance, and the British Commonwealth became another forum in which to condemn South African policies. This exclusion was merely one step, albeit a significant one, in South Africa’s descent from pillar to pariah of the international community.

References

1. 850,458 voted in favor of a republic, and 775,878 against. J. Botha, Verwoerd is Dead, Books of Africa: Cape Town (1967)71.
2. Cape Times, 4 March 1961.
3. Botha, 70-80.
4. House of Assembly Debate, 23 March 1961.
5. Cape Times, 21 March 1961.