Clifford David Gravett and Dr. Aaron Skabelund, History
The purpose of this research was to establish the role of General Douglas MacArthur in the process of rearming Japan following World War II. My question was how MacArthur’s opinions regarding Japanese military evolved during his tenure as Supreme Commander for Allied Forces in the Pacific (SCAP) and head of the occupation of Japan. Documentary evidence demonstrated that MacArthur maintained a stance of permanent disarmament for Japan from 1945 to 1950. The most telling evidence of MacArthur’s interest in an unarmed Japan was his insistence that a no-war clause be included in the 1947-1948 revisions of the Japanese constitution. On July 8, 1950 MacArthur ordered Prime minister Yoshida Shigeru to begin rebuilding the Japanese military; although he subsequently qualified all of his previous statements about a permanently disarmed Japan by stating that he had never intended for Japan not to be able to defend itself, most historians of the period determine that the unexpected outbreak of the Korean War forced MacArthur to rearm Japan. Based on the timeline created by SCAP and State Department documents, I have determined that the Korean War, though it created a convenient excuse for rearming Japan, was not the effective cause in deciding General MacArthur to rearm Japan.
The first task I undertook in my research was to establish what exactly MacArthur’s plans for the Japanese military were in 1945 when he began his tenure as the head of the Japanese occupation. Although the Potsdam Declaration stipulated that Japan be disarmed it was silent on questions about whether or not that should be a permanent state for the islands. MacArthur stated early in his tenure as SCAP that Japan should be perpetually disarmed. The clearest and most significant evidence for this stance was MacArthur’s directions to his chief government aide Courtney Whitney in 1947 about what to include in the required revisions to the Japanese Constitution, these instructions stipulated that Japan should be constitutionally barred from maintaining a military for any purpose whatsoever.
Having clearly established that MacArthur was firmly dedicated to the notion of Japanese pacifism until at least 1947 I sought to trace out how his opinions changed to the extent that on July 8, 1950 he ordered Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru to rearm Japan against the Prime Minister’s own inclinations. My research at the National Archives in College Park Maryland, made possible through an ORCA grant, demonstrated that neither the rise of Communism in China, nor the progression of the Cold War initially swayed MacArthur’s stance on Japanese pacifism. In communications with both government and media sources, MacArthur continued to maintain that Japan should be an unarmed state in Asia throughout 1949 and early 1950. The first point at which MacArthur changed his opinions came in a memo he wrote to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on June 21, 1950 where he stated that the right of Japan to defend itself must be acknowledged. Since American involvement in Korea was not planned for prior to the northern invasion it is unlikely that MacArthur decided to rearm Japan in anticipation of conflict with Korea. Even though the 21st of June was a mere four days prior to the outbreak of formal hostilities, the stance that most historians take in ascribing the rearming of Japan to MacArthur’s preparations for war is false since the United States had made no advance preparations for war with Korea. It is therefore unlikely that MacArthur had impending war with Korea in mind when he admitted that Japan needed to rearm, rather his decision reflected his final acceptance of the inherent personal risk in leaving Japan as an unarmed nation.
As I traced out MacArthur’s motives one of the most important was his political ambitions. MacArthur’s interest in the American presidency during the 1948 election are well known; however, the effect that MacArthur’s dismal showing in the 1948 primary and how that affected his preparations for the 1952 presidential election have not received sufficient attention. My research indicates that a major reason for MacArthur’s changes in opinion in regards to the military situation in Japan was his interest in positioning himself as a strong Cold War figure for the 1952 election. If Japan were to have faced any problems with communism it would have been damaging to MacArthur’s presidential campaign (MacArthur’s fatal blunders during the Korean War and the disastrous Senate hearings that followed were the factors that ultimately killed MacArthur’s political chances in 1952, but in 1950 he looked like a strong candidate for the president). Although MacArthur had been warned by various government and military officials since 1948 that an unarmed Japan was an untenable defense solution, it was not until 1950, with the rise of communism as a political issue that he listened. The individual who convinced MacArthur to accept a rearmed Japan was John Foster Dulles.
The documentary evidence on talks between MacArthur and Dulles is unfortunately quite scarce; however, observers of the two men noted that MacArthur, who was a notoriously poor listener, listened quite attentively to what Dulles said. The substance of Dulles’s words with MacArthur highlighted what was probably already becoming clear to the General. Dulles stated that in the event of either a communist attack on Japan or a domestic uprising within the islands, the United States would be unable to provide sufficient defensive capability to ensure the protection of Japan’s democratic government. MacArthur’s June 21st memo admitting the need for Japan to rearm came immediately following Dulles’s visit to Japan and represented MacArthur’s rejection of the pacifist position he maintained for Japan since the termination of World War II.
The process through which MacArthur actuated the rearming of Japan, namely through personal fiat, was convenient for the General but has caused problems for Japan; having to deal with the implications of maintaining a technically illegal military has proved quite difficult. It is almost certain that given the opportunity to do so the Japanese people would have eventually rearmed, however that process would have been constitutional, creating a stronger Japanese military capable of taking an active role in regional and world affairs. The lasting effects of the forced rearming of Japan are significant and will continue to have important ramifications for the security of the Pacific region as the ambiguity of the Japanese military hampers its ability to be a stabilizing force .