Jeremy B. Pettit and Dr. David L. Paulsen, Philosophy

In their book The Mormon Concept of God1, evangelical scholars Francis Beckwith and Stephen Parrish (hereafter referred to as BP) present several critiques of what they understand to be the Latterday Saint (LDS) concept of God which they claim is philosophically implausible. The majority of their arguments against the incoherency of the LDS concept of God stem from two dilemmas. My paper focused on the second dilemma which can be formally outlined as:

1. Supposing infinite time, eternal progression in a beginning less series of events is implausible in at least three ways.
2. Eternal progression is a fundamental doctrine of LDS theology.
3. Therefore, LDS theology is implausible. (17)2

As premise (2) is correct, I concentrated my critiques of the BP argument on premise (1). My research focused on two areas. First, my research demonstrates that the LDS concept of God is not necessarily committed to the idea of a temporal deity. Indeed, Faulconer posits that the idea of temporally-finite God Arepresent[s] a possible but minority view among Latter-day Saints (187).3 Thus, if the LDS concept of God does not depend on a temporally God, the critiques offered by BP of a temporal God may have no direct bearing on the plausibility of the LDS God. In other words, this argument demonstrates that while both (1) and (2) may be correct, (3) does not necessarily follow.

My second area of research intends to demonstrate that, even should it be shown that the LDS concept of God necessarily relies on the idea of a temporal deity, BP=s critiques do not necessarily follow. To do this, I first presented possible alternatives to the version of infinite time presupposed by BP which involve a temporal deity without seeming to incur the particular implausibilities outlined by BP. The first, briefly suggested by James E. Faulconer in his review of BP, is simply to view time not as an infinite set, but rather as the simple universe of discourse (191).

Secondly, LDS theology seems not only to support the idea of infinite time, but to support the concept of infinite spheres of time4. Thus, while God may have a temporal existence, he may nonetheless surmount our particular sphere of time. This argument is particularly strong because it seems to gain all the advantages accruing from the concept that God transcends our mortal temporality, without incurring the very strong disadvantages inherent in the classical Christian understanding of a God who is simply atemporal.

By far the most difficult part of my research to this point has been attempting to show that even given the understanding of a temporal deity presupposed in BP=s analysis, a temporal God is conceivable. There are three main contentions BP make to support (1). These are that

A. Supposing infinite time, eternally existing souls would already have reached their eventual state.
B. The process of gods helping primal intelligences toward eternal salvation implies infinite gods and infinite intelligences. However, because the gods can be set in a one to one correspondence with the intelligences, the intelligences should all have been “used up.”
C. Either the gods must eventually run out of intelligences or there must be an infinite number of intelligences that will never receive the opportunity for progression. (Hopkins 17, 18)

Contention A is easily refuted by pointing out that BP do not understand the doctrine that, while intelligences and element are eternally co-existent materials in the LDS universe, souls are not. Souls are created by God at a specific juncture in time5. If we assume that, while there is infinite time for the infinitely-existing intelligences, but finite time for the finitely-existing souls, this problem resolves itself. The other two contentions can be resolved in a similar manner.

Finally, after having presented the above arguments defending the concept of a temporal deity, I briefly outlined some of the bigger problems inherent in the classical concept of a timeless God. Notable among these arguments are the problem of prayer and the problem of creation. The problem of prayer can be outlined as an inconsistent triad.

1. The God of classical Christianity both responds to prayers and is timeless.
2. If x responds to something, x is not timeless.
3. Therefore, the God of classical Christianity is both timeless and not timeless.

Obviously, this problem poses a large complication to the classical conception of God.

Similarly, the problem of creation exists when a timeless God, in whom there can be no change, creates a world. Because creation is a change from non-existence to existence, it necessarily involves change in a changeless being. This, too, is poses extreme difficulties for the classical concept of God.

References

1. The Mormon Concept of God: A Philosophical Analysis. Lewiston: Mellon, 1991.
2. Hopkins, L. Shane.”Assessing the Arguments in The Mormon Concept of God: A Philosophical Analysis.” Honors Thesis: Brigham Young University, 1999.
3. Faulconer, James E. “Review of The Mormon Concept of God,” BYU Studies: 185 – 195.
4. For example, speaking of angels (and, we may assume of God as well) Doctrine and Covenants 130:7 reads “They reside in the presence of God . . . where all things for their glory are manifest, past, present, and future, and are continually before the Lord.” See also Abraham 3:3,4,9 and Nibley’s Old Testament and Related Studies (Salt Lake City, UT: Deseret Book, 1986).
5. “God made a tabernacle and put a spirit into it and it became a living soul”(Teachings of the Prophet Joseph Smith, Joseph Fielding Smith, ed. Salt Lake City, UT: Deseret Book, 1976. p. 352- 53.) See also Doctrine and Covenants 93:33