Cory Anderson and Erin G. Longaker, Psychology
Introduction
Correspondence bias, also known as the fundamental attribution error, is the tendency for an observer to overestimate an actor’s personal responsibility for behavior and underestimate situational influences. In other words, a perceiver is generally biased to infer that behavior corresponds to an underlying personal disposition of an actor rather than the constraints of the environment. This phenomenon is a robust area of study in clinical and social psychology (Jones, 1990). However, some research has found there are moderating factors of correspondence bias. For example, D’Agostino and Fincher-Kiefer (1992) conducted a study investigating the relationship between cognitive style and the tendency to make correspondence bias error. They found that participants high in the need for cognition were less likely to make erroneous judgments than those low in the need for cognition.
Based on D’ Agostino and Fincher-Kiefer’s research, we hypothesized that other individual differences may moderate correspondence bias. The purpose of this study was to evaluate the influence of religiosity on interpersonal judgment. The hypothesis was based on the assumption that participants high in intrinsic religiosity would have internalized mainstream religious injunctions against “unrighteous” judgments. It was specifically hypothesized that those high in intrinsic religiosity would be less likely to make interpersonal judgment errors than those low in intrinsic religiosity. We investigated the generalizability of D’Agostino and Fincher-Kiefer’s results on cognitive style hoping to obtain parallel results for religiosity.
Method
A questionnaire packet was administered to 110 students enrolled in undergraduate psychology courses at Brigham Young University. Participants were recruited and tested during Winter 1995 semester and Spring/Summer 1995 terms. Those students enrolled in Psychology 111 classes received extra credit. The primary questionnaire was modeled after an established paradigm to measure correspondence bias (D’ Agostino & Fincher Kiefer, 1992). We wrote two essays, one in favor of and one opposed to day care. The essays were based on speeches written by O’Connor (1983) and White (1981). Fifty-five participants read the pro day-care essay, and fifty-five read the anti-day care essay. They were told that the essays were written by a BYU student as part of a Family Science exam and that the student had no choice about which side of the issue to defend. The participants were instructed to read the essay and answer questions about the writer’s true attitude about the essay. Correspondence bias occurred if participants rated the attitude of the writer as consistent with the essay (either pro daycare or anti-daycare) when the writer actually had no choice which position to defend.
Allport & Ross’ Religious Orientation Scale (196 7) was used to measure intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity and Cacioppo & Petty’s Need for Cognition Scale was used to measure cognitive style (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). Filler questionnaires about religiousness, kindness and intellectualism were included to mask the true nature of the study. Upon completion of the survey, participants were debriefed regarding the real intent of the research.
Results
T he designation of participants within speech conditions created a 2 (speech tone: pro- or anti-) x 2 (Intrinsic religiosity: high or low) between-participants factorial design. We expected to observe a significant interaction between intrinsic religiosity and attitude. We anticipated that participants scoring high In intrinsic religiosity would rate the writer’s true attitude as neutral, regardless of the speech tone. Participants low in intrinsic religiosity would rate the writer’s true attitude about the essay as corresponding with the speech tone. In other words, participants low In intrinsic religiosity would be less likely to fall victim to correspondence bias. We also expected a significant interaction between extrinsic religiosity and attitude. To investigate this we employed a 2 (speech tone: pro or anti) x 2 (extrinsic religiosity: high or low) between-participants factorial design. Participants high In extrinsic religiosity were expected to make the same error as participants low in Intrinsic religiosity. Likewise, participants low in extrinsic religiosity were expected to rate the writer’s true attitude as neutral, regardless of speech tone.
Need for Cognition was investigated using a 2 (speech tone: pro- or anti-) x 2 (need for cognition: high or low) between-participants factorial design. We expected to duplicate D’Agostino and Fincher-Kiefer’s (1992) results, where those high in the need for cognition would be less likely to rate the writer’s true attitude as corresponding to the speech tone than those low in the need for cognition.
We entered participants’ attitude judgments as the dependent variables in separate two-way analyses of variance. In the analysis involving the intrinsic religiosity factor, the results revealed a significant main effect for speech tone, E(l, 96) = 22.00,!). <.001), indicating that the anti-day care essay was seen as significantly less favorable (M=8.69, SD=2.93) than the pro-day care essay (M=5.98, SD= 2.81). However, no significant Attitude x Intrinsic religiosity Interaction was observed, Es{1,96)< 1.04, !).S>. 3 1.. In the analysis involving the extrinsic religiosity factor, the results revealed a main effect of speech, l’.(l, 106) = 23.82 !l. .19.
In the analysis involving the need for cognition variable, the results revealed a main effect of speech, !:(1,101) = 23.62, !l. <.001, once again indicating that the anti-day care essay was seen as significantly less favorable (M=8. 78, SD=2.87) than the pro-day care essay (M=6.06, SD=2,88), but no significant Speech x Need for Cognition interaction was obtained,J’.s(1,101) < 2.86, !).S>.09.
Discussion
A !though It was hypothesized that participants high In Intrinsic religiosity would be less likely to fall victim to correspondence bias than those low in intrinsic religiosity, the results Indicated that there was no difference in attitude ratings among different levels of religiosity. A possible reason the data did not support our hypothesis is that the religiosity Instrument measured intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity, which does not translate into a belief about judging. Another possible reason our hypothesis was not supported may be that the participants may not have understood that the writer of the essay had no choice about which side of the day care issue to defend. Perhaps the essay instructions should have stated more explicitly that the writer had no choice.
Although the results did not indicate any individual characteristics that moderate correspondence bias, the analysis did show that in most cases, participants tended to believe that the writer of the pro-day care essay was more in favor of day care than logic would dictate. The reverse was also observed; the writer of the anti-day care essay was viewed as more opposed to day care than situational constraints would suggest.
Our attempt to duplicate D’Agostino and Fincher-Kiefer’s (1992) results was unsuccessful. Instead the results indicated that there was no significant interaction between differences in cognitive styles and the tendency to make the fundamental attribution error. The inability to replicate D’Agostino and Fincher-Kiefer’s findings may be because we used different essays in our study. Perhaps the differences in content (their essays dealt with the Cuban government) led to different reactions in the participants. Currently there is no instrument that can measure participants’ tendencies to judge. If one were developed, it would assist future researchers in identifying individual moderating characteristics of correspondence bias.
References
- Allport, G. W., & Ross, J, M. “Personal Religious Orientation and Prejudice.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology.1967. 5:432-443.
- Cacioppo, J, T., & Petty, R. E. “The Need for Cognition.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 1982. 42:116-13 1.
- D’Agostino, P.R., & Fincher-Kiefer, R. “Need for Cognition and the Correspondence Bias,” Social Cognition. 1992. 10:151-163.
- Jones, E. E. interpersonal Perception. New York: W. H. Freeman, 1990.
- O’Connel, J. “Children of Working Mothers, What the Research Tells us.” Young Children. 1983. 39:9-15.
- White, B. L. “Should you Stay at Home with your Baby?” Young Children. 1981.37:11-17.