Brian Hagins, Political Science

Utilizing the newly released CIA documents at the National Archives in D.C., this research project explores the ins and outs of the government’s investigations into their use of nuclear power in war. Specifically of interest are the analyses that were produced by the government regarding the probable success of using nuclear weapons to bring the Korean War to a conclusion.

I found five major documents concerning this topic within these secret reports which help illuminate the inner workings of the government agencies, like the CIA, in charge of determining national policies and plans of action. Because of space I will simply explore the most interesting information revealed in the documents and then summarize what they all say about U.S. national policy making.

The first document is NSC 147, produced on April2, 1953. After the Korean war had been going on for about two years, this document was produced as a report by the National Security Council planning board concerning the current situation in Korea. The report is an analysis of the alternative policy options for the future as well as an analysis of the current policy and of the armistice negotiations. I believe this to be the key document beginning discussion into ideas for ending the war more quickly. It also evaluates the alternative plans of action in light of Soviet and Chinese Communist objectives and the ” current” restrictions on military operations. The document is nineteen pages long of which pages thirteen through fifteen are solely devoted to the idea of using nuclear weapons within the Korean war. It is a nice overview analysis of the advantages and disadvantages, political and military, of using nuclear weapons, including Communist reactions, industrial mobilization implications, and U.S. public opinion and foreign reactions to such plans. A major point is made in article 21 on p. 13 of the document that all possible options considered permitted the use of such weapons but that the decision of use would only be made after “a thorough study of military, psychological, and political implications of the use of Atomic weapons has been completed and considered by the [NSC].” No conclusions were actually drawn, but it merely presented the advantages and disadvantages of their use, with the exception of the Communist reaction analysis, which presented a positive view of using nuclear weapons, though dependent on the extent of damage inflicted. It also said that the President could get support for the use of nuclear weapons if he indeed concluded that the people wanted the war to end that badly (that it would be worth it).

The second document is SE-41, produced onApril8, 1953, six days after NSC 147. This most likely is the document where it can be inferred that the CIA concluded the use of Atomic weapons could be used successfully to end the Korean war. The statement is on p.5 of the document, but what is more interesting is the fact that it was merely a restatement of what was said in NSC 147 on p.l5.

The third document is NSC 170, produced on November 9, 1953. This is the draft statement of U.S. policy in pursuing the war. What is of note about this document is not what it says but what it doesn’t say; it doesn’t mention use or even consideration of Atomic bomb use. Of course this document was written during armistice which would have influenced a non-aggressive stance, and so no such need was probably seen to bring up such a harsh measure while a more peaceful end was a possibility.

The fourth document is SNIE 10-4-54 produced on June 15, 1957. Again in this year the possible military use of nuclear weapons is proposed, but this time in regards to “Communist reactions to certain U.S. courses of action with respect to Indochina.” This idea was to be used to help the French in Vietnam, and the document also includes an assessment of Chinese and Soviet reactions to such actions (for noteworthy conclusions, seep. 4 no. 12, p. 5 footnote 8, p. 6 no. 17, and footnotes 10, 11, and 12). The interesting point of this document is that it is further consideration by the government to use nuclear weapons in a small scale war and which also draws positive conclusions on their successful use. Within the proposed plan itself, it states, “Nuclear weapons would be employed if their use were deemed militarily advantageous but nuclear attacks on the Indochinese civil population as a target system would be avoided.” Moreover, what connects this document to the main idea of this project is that China was again considered as a target for nuclear weapons, in this case, in Indochina as well as in the Korean war.

The fifth document is SNIE 100-7-58, and the estimate report’s date is May 29, 1958. Written four years later, this document further pursues the idea of nuclear weapons use by going into depth in its analysis for limited war purposes in future world conflicts. It states up front that the report was requested by the NSC (estimate of reactions to nuclear weapons use) as a result of a study by the Departments of State and Defense, the JCS, and the CIA on US and Allied Capabilities for Limited Military Operations to 1 July 1961. SNIE 100-7-58 analyzes the probable nse of nuclear arms in four cases involving Communist aggression in the Far East and in response to aggression through mid 1961. General conclusions were drawn at first, like local limited use would lead to like retaliation, and if used on China directly the likelihood of retaliation would be high, etc. It also said that free world governments would be impressed by our resistance to Communism but public opinion would condemn U.S. actions. It is quite an interesting study of the possibilities, though I found a few problems with the analysis. However, it was probably this type of analysis that led most in the government not to believe such use would work or would be worthwhile, and therefore, these documents were withhgld-frompublic-criticismand-discardedaspolicy.

A general point that is revealed from these documents is that most of these ideas concerning the possibility of using Atomic weapons originated within the NSC, and then other agencies like the CIA were tasked to look into the matter and explore the possibilities. Now this process makes sense and seems like the proper way for investigating such ideas to determine their risks, etc. Problems can occur in two areas though. The main flaw that was assumed from the beginning of this project is that the agencies assigned the assessment work might produce very bad reports. The CIA for instance, could be seen as the agency which could have been in this position, and since it was revealed in their reports a positive assessment of the use of Atomic weapons, it could be interpreted as being a mistake of this agency. What seems to be the most ironic outcome turns out to be the other option for flaws in the process, and that is when the tasking agency like the NSC actually sways the reports by the other agencies by its initial assessments and/or interpretations of the problem to be investigated.

I feel that this is the most interesting discovery. The documents prove that it was the NSC reports themselves which concluded that such nuclear weapons use would be successful and that the CIA in its report merely copied this idea word for word in support of their superiors. Luckily of course, the idea really did not gain too much support in other areas of critique within the same process and therefore did not become policy. We can only imagine what could have happened had the U.S. followed the initial assessment of the idea, and this I believe is the most important reason such analyses are important for the future and why we should ensure that those people we place in· charge of the government believe what we do. The point of this project seems to be that the processes established to prevent such mistaken analyses from becoming policy may not work and that it is most likely the people who are in charge that may be the largest deciding factor within foreign policy after all.