Andrew S. Gustafson and Dr. H. Carl Marlow, History
Discussion on how to govern Germany began as early as November 15, 1943, when officials from the Soviet Union, England, and the United States met together in England for a short conference. 1 While there, participants divided post-war Germany into zones, and split up zonal governing responsibilities amongst themselves. They created a Berlin based central body called the Control Council to coordinate intra-German Allied governing policy.2 While this political structure seemed practical on paper, it created problems in practice.
Although aware the Control Council would face daunting challenges and conflicting political ideologies, President Franklin D. Roosevelt considered it the best chance for facilitating cooperation with the Soviet Union. On March 26, 1945, he assigned Clay as deputy Military Governor of the American zone in occupied Germany. In this post, Clay’s charge was significant; his job description included administrating the American zone and representing U.S. interests on the Control Council.
Did Lucius Clay mismanage the situation? Answering this question required asking four questions. First, what was Clay’s opinion of the situation before arriving in Germany? Second, who influenced Clay’s initial decisions and what were the opinions of other contemporary leaders? Third, what factors should have warned Clay that a Control Council government with the Soviet Union would not work? Finally, why did Clay persist in efforts to establish a successful Control Council relationship with the Soviets?
My answers to these four questions established that Clay had indeed mismanaged U.S. dealings with the Soviet Union on the Control Council. In fact, at the end of his first year as military Governor of Germany, Clay accurately described his administration over the American zone when he said, “Much has been accomplished.”3 But he also accurately described his success in representing U.S. foreign policy interests when he wrote the State Department saying, “I am not an empire builder.”4 Clay’s skills were in domestic, not in foreign affairs. He skillfully handled German domestic affairs, but mishandled foreign policy dealings with the Soviet Union. Most significantly, Lucius Clay mismanaged American quadripartite relations with the Soviets.
Clay’s mismanagement cost the United States much in the Cold War. Under Clay’s leadership, the United States withdrew its troops from Eastern Germany. This withdrawal allowed the Soviets to establish their western border in East Germany and shifted the playing field further to the West than it otherwise would have been. Moreover, Clay’s leadership method of appeasement led the Soviets to think that aggressive acts on their part would be met by appeasing acts by the U.S. Thus, the Berlin Blockade and propaganda attacks on Western Germany followed.
I became interested in Clay’s management of Sino-American relations in 1945 while researching the specific causes of the Cold War. Although my research did explicate Clay’s dealings with the Soviet Union further research is needed to fill in the picture. The French perspective on Control Council relations with the Soviets affected Clay’s dealings and has yet to be explicated. Also, the Soviet outlook on Control Council dealings needs to be analyzed.
Originally, I focused on understanding Clay’s effect on the development of the Cold War. After beginning research on this topic, however, I found myself increasingly interested in understanding Lucius Clay’s personality. Clay’s life and personality are worthy subjects of study in themselves. Clay’s father had been an influential U.S. Senator. Clay himself later became an industry giant and self-confident member of the upper class. Because of my research into Clay’s management I understand more clearly how one strong personality can significantly further the development of the Cold War.
References
- John Beck, A History of West Germany (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 21.
- Council of Foreign Relations, Documents on Germany, 1944-1971 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Press, 1981), 5.
- Jean Edward Smith, The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay: Germany, 1945-1949, (Indiana, A Publication of the Institute of German Studies,
Indiana University, 1974), 142. - Smith, 118.