Allen Sabey and Dr. Brent D. Slife, Psychology

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In the world of psychological thought and theory, psychologists attempt to explain human behavior. In this attempt, biases and prejudices are crucial to identify and discuss. Prejudices and biases tend to distort or exclude interpretations or explanations that could be meaningful for certain people or certain situations. Slife and Reber (2009) have recently argued that an implicit and pervasive prejudice against theism exists in psychology. This prejudice prevents the inclusion of certain theistic explanations for the serious theist. This prospect of a pervasive implicit prejudice against theism is significant given that many psychologists and researchers hold a theistic world-view. Identifying the prejudice would be the first step at overcoming or eliminating the prejudice in psychological theory, research, and practice and thus make psychology more valid and applicable for the practicing theist.

I set out to explore social psychology for evidence of the implicit prejudice against theism in psychology as identified and discussed by Slife and Reber (2009). My paper was one part of six in a symposium that explored and identified an implicit prejudice against theism in psychology. The goal of our symposium was to identify manifestations of this prejudice in various sub-disciplines within psychology. We presented this symposium at the American Association of Behavioral and Social Sciences Conference in Las Vegas on February 5th, 2010.

In my review of social psychology research via helping behavior literature, I proposed that an implicit prejudice against theism existed to the extent that the research omitted theistic assumptions for the serious theist. As Reber and Slife stated, “implicit prejudices are marked more by omission than commission. That is, the individual, group, or belief system is not derided or attacked directly, but is instead excluded, avoided, or ignored.” To begin my review of the literature, I explored reviews of helping behavior research, allowing a general look at mainstream social psychology literature.
I found that general reviews of helping behavior omit theism because specific studies generally do not consider theism. Thus, theistic possibilities have never really been seriously considered in mainstream social psychology. I then presented a brief defense of researching theism. As an important note, my defense was not about the validity of researching theism per se, but about including the relationship between theism and helping behavior in research.

My defense was two-fold. First, most mainstream social psychologists suppose that while most of their research omits God, an individual could include God in any theory or explanation. This supposition is based on the idea that excluding or including a God does not fundamentally change “reality.” Researchers, in their attempt to be unbiased and neutral, presume the compatibility of their naturalistic findings and the beliefs of the theist. This “misunderstanding about the neutrality” of current social psychological research is problematic for the reason that for the theist, God must be a basic assumption rather than a dispensable variable (Slife & Reber, 2009a, p. 76). In other words, the omission of theistic considerations from social psychology does not make the research neutral; it is a pre-judgment against theists and their worldview.

Second, theism is a possible relevant explanation of helping behavior and good scholarship should include the most relevant possible explanations. Many theists consider helping behavior a theistic act as most major religions emphasize such helping or service to others (see Reber, 2006; Hardy & Carlo, 2005). Regrettably, despite this compelling relevancy, theistic possibilities have rarely been seriously considered. For theism to be so excluded, it would seem that we should at least find a valid reason; perhaps a history of research that includes theistic hypotheses but is intellectually rejected from certain results. But no such history exists. In the end, alternative explanations, such as theism, have been so excluded that it seems as if psychology has “barred supernatural events and processes from any consideration” (Slife & Reber, 2009, p. 76).

While most have not, some researchers have recognized the potential significance of the relationship between theism and helping behavior. However, unfortunately, these researchers still neglect serious theistic assumptions. Rather than researching theistic assumptions (i.e., the current activity of God), researchers use and define religion in ways that neglect the basic beliefs of theists. Thus, this prejudice is particularly glaring if the research intends to include theists but excludes theistic explanations. As one of many examples that I found, Darley and Batson (1973) defined religion as a personality variable while avoiding fundamental theistic notions. They skirted about theistic activities while excluding basic theistic assumptions.

Therefore, I concluded that mainstream social psychology research omits theistic notions while those studies that attempt to include theism construct religion in such a way that is still prejudiced against basic theistic assumptions. Finally, I presented a few suggestions on how viable research could be performed without a theistic prejudice. These mainly consisted of including theistic variables or assumptions in the research and considering a theistic interpretation of data.

As I and the other prejudice researchers have found, this identification of an implicit prejudice is a good first step in overcoming or eliminating the prejudice. Thus, the simple recognition of theistic possibilities in research and practice would help dissolve much of the existing bias. However, recognition alone will not eliminate the prejudice and it will not help psychologists learn whether a theistic program of psychological research really is viable. For that to occur, psychologists would need to put theistic possibilities to the test in the formulation, conduct, and interpretation of their research.To this end, I am inclined to agree with Kenneth Pargament when he stated that “our field needs to widen its borders to include the search for the sacred within its boundaries. Any psychology that neglects or explains away this distinctive, perhaps unique, aspect of life will remain incomplete” (2002, p. 243).

References

• Darley, J., & Batson, C. (1973). ‘From Jerusalem to Jericho’: A study of situational and dispositional variables in helping behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 27(1), 100-108.
• Hardy, S., & Carlo, G. (2005). Religiosity and prosocial behaviours in adolescence: the mediating role of prosocial values. Journal of Moral Education, 34(2), 231-249.
• Pargament, K. I. (2002). Is religion nothing but. . .? Explaining religion versus explaining religion away. Psychological Inquiry, 13, 239–244.
• Reber, J. (2006). Secular psychology: What’s the problem?. Journal of Psychology & Theology, 34(3), 193-204.
• Slife, B., & Reber, J. (2009). Is there a pervasive implicit bias against theism in psychology?. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 29(2), 63-79.